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Technology Support for Small Industries in Developing Countries:
From ‘Supply-Push’ to ‘Eightfold-C’
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The paper is a review of approaches towards technology support for small-scale
manufacturing enterprises in developing countries since the 1970s. Early programmes tended
to suffer from a number of weaknesses, emanating from inadequate conceptualisation of
small firm’ competitiveness and the role of the small-scale sector in industrial development,
as well as from lack of practical experience with project implementation. However, in recent
years important advancements have been made on all these fronts. The paper discusses eight
characteristics of recent technology assistance programmes that have tended to be associated
with project success. Broadly, successful projects are those that embrace the notion that
durable competitiveness of small producers in a competitive economic environment requires
that they develop internal capabilities to effectively asssimilate, use, and adapt product and
process technologies on an ongoing basis.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Small enterprises (SEs) typically make a much larger contribution to manufacturing
employment in poor countries than in economically advanced ones. An estimated 63 percent of
manufacturing employment is generated by registered firms with fewer than 100 employees in
countries with an average income per capita between US$ 500 and 1000. The percentage is
close to 40 percent in countries with average incomes between US$ 1000 and 2000 (Gillis et
al. 1996, p. 496). These figures still grossly underestimate the true state of affairs, since very
large numbers of small firms are not part of the formal economy.
However, the developmental contribution of the great majority of these manufacturing
SEs is limited to generating subsistence employment ‘of last resort’. Hence, in the face of fast
labour force growth and limited employment absorption in the modern large-scale sector,
developing country governments have been under acute pressure to mount efforts to improve
productivity and earnings in these enterprises. Since the early 1970s, this has spawned a
plethora of policies and programmes, and an almost boundless literature documenting these.
In this write-up we review one subset of this literature, namely studies that shed light
on policy measures aimed at strengthening competitiveness through improved technological
performance in SEs involved in manufacturing activities. Technology is considered to be an
important determinant of small manufacturers’ ability to compete in the context of economic
liberalisation and increasing global integration of developing countries. This is because many
of their markets, even traditional ones, are undergoing fast change. In this situation, lack of
capability to adapt and upgrade spells defeat, while firms that are capable of keeping up with,
or even initiate improvements will have an edge over competitors. SE competitiveness is of
course affected by a large number of other important factors, such as the exchange rate or
government subsidies. However, these remain outside the purview of this paper.
The main objective of this paper is not to describe the content of different assistance
programmes that have been implemented in various countries. Such a task would be endless.
Moreover, one cannot learn much from an enumeration of mere facts. The purpose here is,
therefore, to look behind the facts – to the extent that the available evidence permits – and to
identify which approaches have worked and not worked, and why.
The review has some limitations in terms of its coverage. Its main focus is on
programmes and projects with a direct technological content, such as development and
commercialisation of appropriate technologies, provision of technical extension services andQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS21 3
technical training. It does not deal with financial support schemes, even though these are very
common in developing countries. However, SE financing can be given for a number of
purposes, among which technological performance improvement is only one – and often not
the most important one. There is one notable exception, namely venture capital for high-tech
SEs, but this aspect is not covered in depth. Such schemes have begun only recently, are still
experimental in nature and generally modest in scale, and exist only in a limited number of
developing countries. They assume importance in advanced NICs such as South Korea and
Taiwan, but less so in lower-income developing countries.
1
2.  IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALL ENTERPRISES
Before embarking on a policy discussion, it is necessary to highlight some salient
characteristics of SEs in developing countries that are important in the context of this review.
Some degree of generalisation is inevitable here. In developing countries the SE sector
predominantly consists of poor and primitive firms that are constrained in their day-to-day
functioning by the lack of all sorts of inputs and facilities. The sector is typically dominated by
large numbers of self-employed workers and very small family-run ‘micro-enterprises’, many
of which operate in the informal sector. In African countries, the bulk of the SE sector consists
of these types of ‘firms’. However, these activities will not be the main focus of this review,
because the support programmes mounted for them have tended to be much more focused on
poverty alleviation than on business growth.
2 Support aimed at technological development has
not been a very prominent form of assistance for this group.
The most important group of SEs for the purpose of this paper is constituted by the
substantial numbers of formal small-scale firms employing, say, between five and 50 people,
including some hired labour. These types of firms are very common throughout the developing
world, especially in Asia and Latin America. But even such small-scale companies operating in
the formal sector are best typified as ‘small workshops’, whose managerial practices and
technological characteristics are worlds removed from those of modern large companies. They
tend to be engaged in well-established or even traditional activities. Except in some of the
Asian NICs, few SEs are in the forefront in new high-tech sectors, and only a small minority
engages to some extent in formal R&D. This contrasts with the situation in developed
economies where many small companies make significant contributions to the generation of
innovations (e.g., Cosh, Hughes and Wood, 1996; Rothwell and Zegveld, 1985), and whereQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS21 4
small firms staffed by educated professionals are well represented in new, knowledge-based
industries such as information technology and biotechnology.
Researchers have often commented on the underdeveloped state of a dynamic modern
small and medium-sized industrial segment in developing countries, especially in Africa. Here,
the dualistic industrial structure is so obvious that the term ‘missing middle’ has been coined
to capture it. There is a large degree of internal heterogeneity among SEs, but on the whole
the SE sector in developing countries is economically and technologically backward and
disadvantaged relative to firms in the large-scale modern sector, and it is usually quite obvious
in which side of the spectrum a firm belongs. The cut-off point for the SE sector is usually
somewhere in the range of 50 employees, or 100 at the most.
3. EARLY PROGRAMMES
The SE sector was firmly put on the mental map of LDC policy makers in the 1970s,
as part of a general disenchantment with industrialisation strategies favouring top-down
modernisation through concentration of investment and expansion of the modern large-scale
sector that had been pursued in the 1950s and 60s. As the benefits of ‘trickle-down’ were
apparently limited, income-creation approaches based on direct targeting of poorer sections of
the population gained widespread favour. The International Labour Organisation took the lead
in documenting the precarious position of those working in small (including informal)
enterprises, and the serious constraints faced by them (e.g., Sethuraman, 1981).
Therefore, it is not surprising that the early technology support programmes designed
for SEs predominantly adopted a ‘supply-push’ approach (UNDP et al., 1988). It was thought
that the availability of a variety of services would help overcome their resource constraints and
thereby help them to strengthen their competitiveness. Many countries set up state-run small
and medium enterprise development organisations (SMIDOs) that were charged with the task
of providing these services, which covered such aspects as technical and management training,
marketing assistance, advice about technology choice, assistance with technology
procurement, provision of subsidised finance and so on. The aims of these programmes were
generally broader than technological upgrading alone. In addition, there were a number of
bodies, both state and NGO, that were focusing more specifically on technology support.
There have been some good results from these programmes, but they were also beset with a
large number of problems. Here, we only discuss some issues that bear closely onQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS21 5
technological support specifically. Inevitably, we have to employ a very broad brush approach
which does not do justice to the specificities associated with particular programmes and
variations in conditions across different countries.
(a) Primitive notion of SE competitiveness
To begin with, the conceptual framework underlying these programmes was somewhat
primitive. The term ‘competitiveness’ was based on the standard textbook neo-classical model,
in which economic performance of firms is a function of their costs and prices in a static
framework in which technology is exogenous. According to this framework, the precarious
existence of many SEs was largely due to the fact that larger firms could be expected to be
more efficient as a result of economies of scale and the use of more modern and productive
technologies. The question whether small enterprises were able to operate efficiently at all was
hotly debated. A number of studies were conducted that attempted to find evidence in favour
of the SE case, or vice versa, depending on the ideological bent of the researchers (e.g., Little
et al., 1987; Goldar, 1988).
On hindsight, one can see that the conventional textbook conceptualisation of the firm
was somewhat harmful because it prevented researchers and policy makers to explore
approaches that did not match this model. This is noticeable from the fact that these older
studies invariably judged SE competitiveness by formally comparing relative costs and prices
of individual firms of different sizes. In other words, there was no recognition of potential
competitive advantages that might accrue through exploitation of cluster or network effects
among groups of small firms. Another problem with the early approach was that the
preoccupation with the problematic horizontal (competitive) relations of SEs with their larger
counterparts to some extent prevented researchers and policy makers to probe for growth
possibilities for SEs through development of complementary (vertical) relations with these
firms, although some notable exceptions did exist.
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(b) Technology equates machines
Another limitation of the early programmes was that they conceptualised technology
primarily as machinery and equipment, in line with the current thinking in the literature about
technology and development in the 1970s (e.g., Sethuraman, 1977; Harper, 1984). Thus, theQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS21 6
main aim of the programmes at that time can be seen as bolstering the competitive position of
individual small firms relative to larger ones through the adoption of more efficient ‘hardware’,
with which they could lower their cost of production and/or improve the quality of their
products. The underlying assumption was that a one-time injection of improved technology
would be sufficient for strengthening the competitive position of SEs in the economy.
Needless to say, such a one-time injection is useful, but by itself it is inadequate.
Competitiveness should derive from SEs’ capacity or capability to absorb and improve process
and product technology on an ongoing basis. Yet, some useful lessons can be drawn from
these early programmes, which are discussed below.
(c) ‘Appropriate’ technologies and their limitations
The question as to how SE technology (as defined above) could be improved in the
best way led to a big debate. Some claimed that the lack of competitiveness of SEs was mainly
caused by the fact that efficient technologies suited to small-scales of operation did not exist.
4
Others tried to show that such technologies did indeed exist in several industries, but that there
were serious disincentives to their adoption (Stewart, 1977; Bhalla, 1985). These emanated
from distorted factor prices (especially in the form of heavily distorted allocation of credit in
favour of the large-scale sector and overvalued local currencies), and a variety of other
unfavourable macro-economic policy variables favouring demand for products made by large
modern firms (such as product standards based on developed country conditions, unequal land
ownership and so on) (Stewart, 1987; Stewart and Ranis, 1990; Haggblade et al., 1990).
Both arguments carried some weight. The first one led policy makers to promote
research in science and technology (S&T) institutes aimed at the development of small-scale
efficient technologies. Much was written about the different options that could be used for
achieving this, namely downscaling of large-scale modern technologies, upgrading traditional
technologies, or blending modern with traditional technologies (see, e.g., Bhalla et al., 1984;
James, 1989). Foreign donors were also much involved in these types of projects. This was the
golden age of the Appropriate Technology movement.
This approach gained a degree of success, but there have also been many failures.
Many so-called ‘appropriate’ technologies failed at the commercialisation stage. One big
lesson had to be that technology development in the public domain and its subsequent
diffusion to the private sector in top-down fashion was not an effective model.
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scientists of the technology institutes were competent engineers, but they knew little about the
requirements of poor producers and communities, were usually located far away from them,
and had little awareness about the importance of socio-economic variables. Even where that
was not the case, significant communication barriers between developers and prospective users
tended to preclude effective exchange of information. Incentive structures in these institutes
did not favour such unprestigious research activities either (see below).
The success cases (which were mainly situated in East Asian countries such as Japan
and China) highlighted that technologies have to be developed in close collaboration with the
prospective users through a process in which these users can take significant control over the
direction of the project and in effect assume ownership of the technology. Another essential
condition for success is that equipment producers (i.e. capital goods makers) have to be
involved at an early stage of development, since these actors (rather than the users or the
technology institutes) have to take care of repair, maintenance, replication, and modification in
the light of practical experience by the users. Technologies are rarely perfect when they come
‘off-the-shelf’. Often, several rounds of forward and backward feedback of information
between developers and users are needed to improve and adapt them in iterative fashion. For
this reason, the best technology development model appears to be one which involves close
and ongoing interaction between users, institutes and producers as equal partners with
complementary knowledge and skills.
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(d) Lack of incentives and competitive pressures for SEs
There were other major design and implementation flaws associated with many of
these early programmes, and it has to be noted that some programmes that are currently
running are still suffering from these problems. Supplying crucial missing ingredients to SEs is
a good thing in underdeveloped economies where well functioning markets for essential
services rarely exist, but in practice it has all too often bred complacency among the recipients.
There were cases where small entrepreneurs took the assistance for granted simply because
they belonged to the underprivileged SE class.
But even in cases where entrepreneurs genuinely appreciated the support they were
receiving, results have often been disappointing. This has been especially the case when
insufficient attention was paid to market incentives that would induce small entrepreneurs to
take up the assistance and make good use of it, and when market pressures on the firms wereQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS21 8
simultaneously removed. Incentives and market pressures are absolutely essential for ensuring
success in technology support programmes, not only because they spur people into action but
also because they give concrete direction to their efforts and guide them towards identifying
what specific support they need. We will come back to these issues in the next section.
(e) Problems with the functioning of institutions
Generally there have also been big problems with the incentive structures in the institutions
providing the assistance. Providing support for small enterprises in developing countries is not
as rewarding and glamorous as assistance to bigger business. It is less visible, does not bring
political influence or important contacts, and much effort has to be put in to achieve good
results. Not surprisingly, the most successful technology support projects have involved highly
committed individuals who were not primarily driven by high monetary rewards.
7 In addition
to lacking incentives, many programmes have lacked sanctions on bad performance. State-run
or parastatal organisations were commonly functioning with ‘soft budget constraints’ and did
not have to rely on commercial sources of revenue for their continued existence.
There have also been organisational problems. Assistance to SEs usually has to involve
groups of them in order to be worthwhile. Organising and interacting effectively with groups is
difficult, especially when institutions are geographically some distance removed from the SEs.
Communication and effective interaction with small entrepreneurs is also difficult because of
class and education differences between assistance providers and the entrepreneurs. On top of
all this, staff of technology institutes has sometimes lacked the required education and
experience, and it has been difficult to attract more talented and capable individuals because of
the unattractive salaries and career options.
The SMIDO programmes have had even more modest results than the programmes run
by specialised technology development institutes and NGOs, and it is not worthwhile to dwell
much on their role and functioning. Their activities and performance have been evaluated in
many studies, including several studies commissioned by aid donors that were supporting these
organisations.
8 They suffered from similar incentive and organisational problems as the
technology institutes. However, in addition they lacked effectiveness because of their wide
coverage, both in terms of the nature of the business activities they promoted and the types of
the services provided. The manpower tended to be more generalist than specialist. The role of
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assistance with choice, procurement and financing of equipment for new ventures, and
sometimes also provide management and technical training and consultancy. More often than
not, the technology choices were not guided by sound knowledge of the relevant options and
their (lack of) suitability in the local situation, and the new ventures were often run by
inexperienced entrepreneurs. The repayment record of the financing schemes, based on soft
loans, tended to be quite bad. Training was often modelled on approaches suited to more
developed countries, emphasising formal off-the-job education that was insufficiently geared
to the specific technical bottlenecks that individual enterprises might be facing.
(f) The lack of a conducive macro-environment
The ‘macro-incentives approach’ to technology improvement mentioned earlier gained
considerable influence in the 1980s, a bit later than the appropriate technology approach. A
series of studies was undertaken which linked inappropriate technology choices to biased
incentive structures emanating from adverse macro- and ‘meso’-level policies that were
commonly pursued in developing economies in the 1970s. Its arguments shed much light on
why the effectiveness of the early SE programmes remained so limited. It is probably true that
the lack of success of these programmes can be traced as much to problems in the general
economic and institutional environment in which they had to function as to flaws in
conception, design and implementation at the micro-level.
In particular, the problem of lack of market opportunities faced by SEs referred to
above, was at least partly caused by the general economic malaise and the lack of growth
possibilities for small companies in many economies pursuing import-substitution strategies
that favoured modern, large-scale forms of production. Highly overvalued local currencies and
cheap credit made it very attractive for large import-substituting companies to establish highly
capital-intensive and integrated production facilities. This was so even in industries that are
characterised by a very high divisibility of tasks in the production process, such as
manufacturing of automobiles, trucks and tractors and electric consumer goods. In an
environment where capital goods were so cheap, there was little incentive to establish
backward linkages to local companies, even though countries commonly tried to encourage
localisation through a variety of tax and financial incentives and local content regulations. The
impact of these policies has generally been very modest. Few policy makers understood that
the Japanese success in establishing elaborate and dynamic subcontractor networks was firstQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS21 10
and foremost driven by an extreme capital scarcity in the economy, which affected even the
largest keiretsu (Watanabe, 1983).
To the extent that the approach advocated ‘to get the prices right’, it tied in well with
the sort of reforms that countries had to introduce when they embarked on structural
adjustment. However, the approach went well beyond pointing towards biased factor prices. It
also drew attention to major institutional, legal and structural constraints that prevented the
SE sector from flourishing, and that could not be remedied quite so easily.
(g) Lack of integration of SEs in countries’ overall industrialisation strategies
The macro-incentives approach was particularly useful because there was but a dim
awareness about how the SE sector was linked to, and affected by what was happening in the
economy in general. Curiously, the huge numbers of studies about small-scale enterprises and
the informal sector that were generated in the 1970s never made any mention of the formal
industrial sector, while studies about countries’ industrialisation in general in turn tended to
disregard the SE sector.
This lack of integration in research had its effect on the policy level. Policy makers
generally did not properly integrate the promotion of their SE sector within their broader
industrialisation strategies and objectives, almost as if it was existing in a vacuum. Recently,
one can see some signs of positive change in this respect in middle and higher income
developing countries of Asia and Latin America (see next section), but the problem remains
acute in many low-income African countries even in the 1990s. For example, King observes
about the Kenyan situation that:
…the conceptual separation of Kenya’s industrial policy from its micro and small-scale
policy development is unfortunate. What is noticeably lacking is a consensus at the
highest level in Kenya about an industrialisation policy that moves the country ahead to
a next and more competitive stage of manufacturing intermediate goods, but at the same
time makes the micro-enterprise world an integral part of that industrial project. (King,
1996, p.200)
The SE sector received even less attention in countries’ science and technology (as distinct
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Governments and aid agencies have historically concentrated their efforts … on building
up the science and technology infrastructure in the formal education system and in
government R&D institutions…. For many developing country governments and aid
agencies, S&T policy had become equated with activities exclusively in the public sector,
and is modelled on S&T institutions in industrialised countries that exist in a quite
different context. … In consequence there has been a major under-investment over many
years in essential parts of the innovative process located in firms and on farms. (Barnett,
1995, p.20)
This was (and still is) a serious situation because the bulk of science and technology
development in less developed countries takes the form of incremental applied and informal
adaptations and improvements made ‘on the shop floor’. Technology institutes are most useful
if they support and enhance that process, rather than conduct prestigious but expensive basic
research.
Unfortunately, only a few developing countries have recognised these basic facts and
have modelled their S&T policies in full support of their broader industrialisation strategies,
notably the fast industrialising countries in East Asia (especially South Korea and Taiwan).
9 In
other developing countries, S&T policies and strategies have historically hardly intersected
with the socio-economic objectives of industrial strategy, let alone that they would pay any
attention to the technological requirements of SEs in that process. Many countries still suffer
from such legacies, even those that have made a serious effort at reforming their industrial
policies to incorporate the SE sector.
Nigeria is a good example of such a case. A number of useful measures were recently
introduced in this country as part of its industrialisation strategy to strengthen the
technological position of the SE sector, including practical support for capability building
through training and technical consulting services, and a programme promoting industrial use
of indigenous raw materials. Yet, its S&T policy is still based on its pre-structural adjustment
National Development Plan of 1981-85. Its objectives are vague and lack any degree of
operationalisation. It aims, among other things, ‘… to increase public awareness in S&T and
their vital role in national development and well-being; to direct S&T efforts along identified
national goals; … to create, increase and maintain an indigenous S&T base through research
and development, and … to strengthen the technological base of the nation’ (Oladeji, 1998,
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4. TOWARDS A DYNAMIC CONCEPT OF SE COMPETITIVENESS
Practices and policies for technological upgrading of SEs have moved forward in
recent years, especially in the 1990s. We start by examining the changing notion of SE
competitiveness. In the next section we look at the effects of this, and of the lessons learnt
from failure at the project level during the previous period (already described above), on the
design and implementation of recent technology support programmes in different developing
countries.
One can clearly discern an influence of the major changes in the economic policy
climate that have occurred since, roughly, the early 1980s. In particular, we should mention
the ascent of neo-liberal thinking which de-emphasised state involvement in the economy,
spelled the demise of inward-looking approaches to industrialisation, and advocated increased
openness to trade and foreign investment. The effects of these policies on local
industrialisation have been varied. Some of the relatively advanced developing countries in
East and Southeast Asia and Latin America are increasingly being integrated in large regional
and/or global trade and production networks that are steadily growing in importance. In
contrast, in many of the truly low-income economies, where the adoption of outward-oriented
policies took place in the context of heavy structural adjustment programmes, industrial
development has suffered. Sub-Sahara Africa’s share in global manufacturing, already very
low with 0.4 percent in 1985, declined to 0.3 percent ten years later (UNIDO, 1996, p.22).
Some writers claim that substantial de-industrialisation occurred in the region, although the
evidence on this is not entirely conclusive.
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In either case, however, the old static notion of SE competitiveness proved
increasingly inadequate in the context of the big shift in countries’ macro-economic climate
and the forces of global integration and marginalisation. One can notice important common
elements of change in the literature about small enterprise development across major regions.
In particular, the old view that SEs could improve their competitiveness by adopting technical
improvements made by other actors is slowly beginning to be replaced by the notion that
enduring competitiveness has to depend much more on their own internal capacity to make an
independent and unique contribution to local technical progress. This is happening in Asia,
Latin America and Africa alike, although there are major inter-regional differences as well.
(a) The East Asian NICs: Systemic competitiveness based on technological capabilityQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS21 13
The shift is most drastic in the most advanced and fast-industrialising developing
economies of Asia and Latin America (especially the East Asian NICs) where one can see a
growing realisation that the role of SEs has to go well beyond employment creation for the
poor. Rather, they have an essential role to play in the context of their export-oriented
industrialisation drive and their increasing participation in international trading and production
networks. In the dynamic industrial environment of these countries (until 1997 at least), one
notices that SE competitiveness begins to be perceived as an integral part of industrial
competitiveness as a whole. This is mainly because of the perceived complementarity of the
activities that large and small firms undertake. The emphasis is on the need for local specialist
suppliers that can supply products and services to customers downstream in the ‘value chain’,
react quickly and flexibly to their changing requirements, and begin to play a role in the design
and implementation of technological improvements. Thus, SE competitiveness is increasingly
being perceived in terms of their internal capabilities to choose, use, adapt and develop
technology. Such capabilities are a must in order to become, and retain competitiveness in a
fast-evolving environment which continuously places new demands upon large and small firms
alike (see, e.g., the studies in Meyanathan, 1994; and UNIDO, 1996, pp. 53-6)
  By moving in this direction, the SE literature about this region is beginning to link up
with the large body of literature about technological learning, industrialisation and
development that began to emerge since the late 1970s. This literature largely replaced the old
static technology-choice framework discussed in the previous section. The basic point of
departure in the ‘capability literature’ is that the existence of adequate local skills and
knowledge for incorporating more advanced technologies in developing countries cannot be
taken for granted. Whereas technological hardware (machines and equipment) can be
transferred, the capability to make use of that hardware cannot be transmitted so easily. It has
to be developed through a gradual learning process, resulting from purposive efforts to
assimilate, adapt and modify technology. Many of these efforts take the form of small
improvements ‘on the shop floor’, rather than formal R&D. With the advent of the capability
literature, the study about technology and development changed significantly in terms of focus.
In contrast to the earlier technology choice literature, it views technology primarily in terms of
human knowledge and skills rather than machines, and it views technology as an endogenous
factor within firms and developing countries more broadly.
11QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS21 14
The trends towards a more dynamic interpretation of SE competitiveness in line with
this body of literature are evident even in countries like South Korea and Singapore, whose
earlier policies were heavily biased towards the promotion of large-scale firms. There was a
remarkable shift in their policy-stance after they began to experience the difficulties associated
with advancing into higher-technology-based manufacturing without an extensive local
subcontractor network of SEs (see Wong, 1994; Lee, 1992; Lee, 1991; Leipziger and Petri
(1993); Chon, 1996; Baek, 1992; Cho, 1995; and Chung and Park, 1998). Korea in particular
was (and still is) highly dependent on Japan for imports of a variety of crucial parts and
components in the electronics industry. Not only has this led to a large trade imbalance
between the two countries, but it also does not meet the Korean companies’ increasingly
specialised design requirements. The Japanese are also increasingly unwilling to supply Korean
firms on good terms and according to their needs, as they are increasingly perceived as
competitors in the race for a good slice of the electronic components market. An even more
serious problem is that in these high-tech industries, most of the advanced capabilities are
actually built up in the small supplier companies. Only about 15 per cent of the product value
is added in the assembly stage. Backward and inefficient parts suppliers thus leads to high
costs of production for the assemblers downstream, and (even more crucial) it also holds up
the design-improvement process (Chon, 1996).
(b) Middle-income Asia and Latin-America: Dynamism in SE clusters
A growing concern with the internal economic dynamism of the SE sector is also
noticeable in recent literature about middle-income developing countries in Asia and Latin
America, such as Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Mexico and Peru. However, rather
than emphasising the integral, systemic nature of SE competitiveness as in the East Asian
cases, most of this literature has been primarily focused on the question under which
conditions SEs could display independent economic dynamism. This difference in perspective
is likely to be a reflection of the fact that there is still much more dualism and lack of
integration between large and small forms of production in these economies compared with
NICs such as South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong. Complementarity in relations is
obviously important in some industries, but there are also vast areas in which SEs function
independently or where they exist as an alternative mode of production to large-scale
manufacturing. In contrast to 1970s literature, however, the central focus of these recentQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS21 15
studies has been on groups of SE, especially on how inter-firm interactions in networks and
clusters might contribute to their collective competitiveness (e.g., Humphrey and Schmitz,
1996; Schmitz, 1995; Nadvi, 1996; Tewari, 1996; Rabelotti, 1995; Cawthorne, 1993; Sandee,
1995; Pedersen, et al., 1994; Knorringa, 1995).
Drawing on writings about flexible specialisation in dynamic industrial districts in
developed countries such as Italy (e.g., Piore and Sabel, 1984; Best, 1990; Pyke and
Sengenberger, 1992), these studies have generally suggested that clustering in developing
countries can also create effects that help sustain long-term economic competitiveness among
the participating firms. Presumably then, the writers presuppose that this form of economic
and spatial organisation gives rise to some degree of capability to initiate and diffuse
technological and organisational improvements. Unfortunately, this claim has remained largely
unsubstantiated. The assumption about technological dynamism remains largely implicit, and
the innovation and learning effects have not been investigated systematically. Even though the
term ‘learning’ tends to crop up in some of the studies, it is often not clear what is meant by
this, or what the learning entails in practice. The problem is that the studies are not yet well
linked to the current literature about technological capability and development (Albu, 1997).
Their main sources of inspiration are the economic organisation literature (transaction costs
theory) and sociological literature. The writers in this group are generally sensitive to the
socio-political and institutional context within which SE clusters function, and these variables
have received more attention than ‘hard’ economic and technological ones.
There are some other studies about SE in middle-income economies that do not belong
to the cluster literature, but these have received less attention from practitioners in the small
enterprise promotion arena. This is unfortunate because they are explicitly concerned with the
nature, determinants and impact of internal technological dynamism of SEs and they are
therefore potentially quite relevant for policy and programme design. Firstly, one can learn
from them that the technological development potential in the SE sector is heavily
concentrated in one specific industry, namely metalworking / light engineering. This is because
metal workshops are well equipped to copy, and make appropriate adaptations to, products
made by large formal-sector companies or imported from more advanced countries.
Appropriate adaptations consist, for example, in design simplifications and substitution of local
materials for imported ones. Such adaptations can lead to significant price reductions and
bring new products within reach of broad sections of the local population, thereby helping to
ensure widespread diffusion of improved technologies. SEs in this industry also tend to beQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS21 16
located close to their markets, which facilitates information exchange between producers and
the users of their products and ensures that adaptations fit in with user needs. In countries
such as Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, Thailand, Pakistan and Zimbabwe (to mention but a
subset of the available evidence), small-scale producers of metal products have built up
considerable technological knowledge and skills over time by engaging in copying and
adaptation of increasingly complex products.
12 Some started with simple repair of imported
farm machinery or simple machine tools such as manual lathes and drilling machines, then
moved into actual manufacturing, and gradually evolved into leading medium and large-scale
producers of complex engineering products. Over time, the efforts of these firms extended
way beyond simple technology assimilation, as they acquired significant internal design
capabilities. However, even these studies are not well integrated with the current literature
about technological capabilities and development. Only in two studies, an explicit attempt has
been made to explicitly use the capability concept and to apply the analytical insights from that
literature as a framework for study  (Romijn, 1998; Maldonado and Sethuraman, 1992).
(c) Low-income African countries: Technical capability building in individual firms
In the low income-countries, many of which are situated in Africa, the concept of SE
competitiveness is also evolving, but more under duress than as a result of emerging
opportunities. These countries are increasingly feeling the crunch of international competition
from more advanced economies. Their own large-scale industrial sectors have all but
collapsed, and they are not being targeted in a big way by foreign investors. Hence, they are
beginning to look towards SEs as a potential force for industrial regeneration. Increased
attention is being devoted to the question whether, or under what circumstances, SEs can
function as an engine of industrial growth and become a source of competitive advantage in
their own right. There is also a growing concern that such regeneration cannot and should not
be built on low wages, dismal working conditions and paltry profits, at least not beyond the
short term. Acquisition of technological capabilities is beginning to be perceived as a major
requirement for escaping from the low-wage, low-skills scenario in a sustainable manner. It is
also recognised that this will require a supportive policy environment, one in which the SE
sector is fully integrated in the design and implementation of industrial support programmes
and technology policy (see Wangwe, 1993; Oladeji, 1998; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 1997; King,
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Thus, one notices that the literature across the different regions is slowly beginning to
converge around the theme of technological capability building, even though the context
within which this is happening is remarkably different across regions. In the Asian NICs,
technological learning in SEs needs to occur not just for their own sake, but also (and
especially) because their skills and knowledge has to feed into, and contribute, to the
competitiveness of the larger industrial system of which they are an integral part. In contrast,
in the poorest African countries, where industrial linkages are still rather underdeveloped,
enhanced technological capabilities contribute mainly to increased competitiveness of firms as
individual entities rather than industrial systems. For the same reason, clustering and
networking aspects have not received as much attention in recent African SE studies as in the
middle-income economies of Asia and Latin America. Such organisational forms are simply
less common in these countries, and to the extent that they do exist, they tend to be
organisationally and institutionally less developed than their Asian and Latin American
counterparts.
5. INNOVATIVE APPROACHES AT THE PROJECT LEVEL
The new developments at the conceptual level are clearly reflected in the design and
implementation of several recent technology assistance programmes and projects. In addition,
the modalities of assistance also evolved under the influence of accumulating practical
experience with project design and implementation by practitioners. The widespread lack of
success of earlier assistance models had led to a great deal of soul searching.
The results of these developments are slowly beginning to emerge in recent projects
and programmes. However, even now, most of the documentation about them still does not
go much beyond a description of the main features of the content of assistance packages.
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Such materials are of limited value when one wants to draw lessons about the effectiveness of
different approaches. In the absence of abundant analytical materials, the following paragraphs
are inevitably rather piecemeal.
(a) Important success factors: from triple-C to eightfold-C
In spite of the scarcity of good analytical studies about effectiveness of technology
support projects and programmes for SE, it is possible to identify several broad principles thatQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS21 18
have been associated with success in SE technology assistance projects documented in the
more insightful studies. Although some of the features are present more strongly in some
geographical regions than in others, quite often they do to some extent cut across the regional
variations observed above.
We begin with what Humphrey and Schmitz have termed the ‘Triple-C approach’ to
industrial policy (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996). When comparing assistance schemes across
different developing countries, they found the following three factors to be the most critical to
good outcomes:
Customer-orientation: The old ‘supply-push’ method has given way to an approach in
which project efforts are much more driven by meeting customer needs and demands. Access
to a dynamic market channel that can provide an impetus for, and give concrete and specific
direction to firms’ improvement efforts, is now considered to be an important necessary
condition for successful assistance delivery.
Collectivity: Support is likely to be more effective when it is provided to groups of
SEs rather than individual producers. This insight grew mainly out of the clustering literature.
Group-based assistance is not only more cost-effective and practical than individual support,
but it can also lead to the establishment of linkages between SEs that can lead to higher
efficiency and interactive learning.
Cumulativeness: One-off improvements are of limited use. Being competitive is not a
state but a process that requires continuous improvements. This in turn requires that firms (or
clusters of firms) build up a capacity to continuously upgrade their products, processes and
production organisation and become more self-reliant in this respect.
While the above classification raises highly pertinent issues, the three success factors
do not have equal status. The first factor appears to be predominantly concerned with the
objectives or focus of the support, whereas the second one is more concerned with the actual
modality of assistance delivery. The third one is yet another category because it seems to refer
more to the ultimate impact of the support than to an attribute of assistance projects
themselves.
In this paper we suggest a more systematic classification of project success factors, by
making a broad distinction between (i) project attributes concerned with the objectives / broad
focus of assistance projects and (ii) those concerned with the actual mechanisms of assistance
delivery. Impact-related factors such as cumulativeness are not included. Instead, we focus on
corresponding attributes relating to actual project objectives and implementation that are likelyQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS21 19
to promote the relevant outcomes. This leaves us with two out of three attributes listed by
Humphrey and Schmitz. In addition, six other factors emerged from the literature review
undertaken for this paper. Curiously, each of these six additional factors can also be
denominated by a term starting with the letter ‘C’, so that we can introduce the ‘eightfold-C
approach’ here.
The first three are primarily features relating to the aims or focus of assistance projects,
while the remainder relate more to the instruments used to achieve these aims. A summary of
all attributes is given in Table 1. In addition to the two features already discussed above,
namely customer focus and collectivity, we have:
Capability focus: Although the non-availability of appropriate ‘hardware’ (i.e.
machinery and equipment) can sometimes be a crucial constraint on the competitiveness of SE,
the development of the human factor in the production process is at least as important. In a
competitive economic environment, SE need to acquire enhanced knowledge and skills about
how to choose, use and improve technology (Romijn, 1998). Only then will they be able to
engage in the sort of cumulative adaptation and improvement that Humphrey and Schmitz
referred to.
Context: It goes without saying that a supportive economic environment in which
growing and technologically dynamic markets constantly provide new potential opportunities
for technological upgrading of SE greatly facilitates project success. This also embraces the
older notion of a macro-economic policy environment in which technology choices will not be
biased against small and labour-intensive forms of production. However, these are not actual
project attributes. The emphasis here is more on incentives for endogenous technological
development and continuous learning that come from assistance projects aiming to create,
what Levy et al.(1994) have called ‘an information-rich environment’ for small firms.
Examples include sponsoring courses on selected topics, facilitating the use of specialised
consultants, and promoting information sharing among firms.
Complementarity: The concrete content of the assistance has to be tailored to fit in
with the general level of economic and technological development of the economy in question.
This may appear to be very obvious, but older projects did suffer from such lack of fit. For
example, many low-income countries tried to promote subcontracting schemes prematurely.
Only now, it is only in the relatively advanced economies of Southeast and East Asia such as
South Korea and Malaysia where the lack of a local subcontractor sector has recently emerged
as a crucial bottleneck. This is the sort of ‘demand-pull’ environment where there is a lot ofQEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS21 20
scope to build technological support programmes for SE around backward linkage
development in the economy in general.
Concentration: As we have seen, earlier programmes often lacked effectiveness
because the institutions delivering them were ‘spreading their efforts too thinly’ in terms of the
number and variety of economic activities. In such programmes it was very difficult to build up
in-depth expertise about the technological and market characteristics of specific industries and
the main actors in these industries, how SEs are positioned in these industries and what their
main industry-specific problems might be. In response to these problems, the ‘sub-sector
approach’ to SE promotion, launched in the early 1990s, advocates that research and
assistance should concentrate on commodity-specific sub-sectors. By giving considerable
weight to the study of interactions between firms of different sizes and at different stages in
the supply chain, this approach can provide a more thorough insight into the competitive
context in which the target enterprises operate (Boomgard et al., 1992). The adoption of the
sub-sector approach has also increased the effectiveness of projects by concentrating project
assistance efforts. Instead of aiming to target beneficiaries directly, some projects have worked
with and through ‘nodal actors’ in the supply chain, such as traders or material suppliers, who
interact with large numbers of small producers (Dawson and Jeans, 1997).
Coordination: Early assistance efforts also suffered from lack of coordination between
different service providers and support activities. This is most evident in the East and
Southeast Asian countries where governments have tended to establish very elaborate and
wide-ranging support structures for SE, encompassing many different financing, training, and
consulting projects and programmes. The responsibility for these programmes would be
distributed widely over different governmental institutions and departments. Inefficiencies in
assistance delivery were common because of duplication of effort. To make matters worse,
programmes would frequently be revamped, merged with other initiatives, or replaced with
new ones. Such obvious lack of transparency must have been a nightmare for many potential
beneficiaries. It must have been a big effort simply to find out how the support structure
worked and where to turn for which type of assistance. In recent years, one sees that
governments in these countries have begun to improve matters by introducing ‘one window’
assistance delivery (Meyanathan, 1994).
‘Carrot-and-stick’ approach: We have seen that the flawed incentive structure both
for the assistance providers and the beneficiaries was perhaps the singlemost important cause
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recent projects, much attention has been devoted to the careful design of a more appropriate
set of incentives (see especially Tendler and Amorim, 1996). This appears to entail a
combination of ‘carrots’, i.e. potential rewards that will motivate the participants to take
action, and ‘sticks’, i.e. a set of sanctions that come into operation when they fail to do their
best. The carrots are a source of positive pressures on the participants, while the sticks
generate negative ones.
The design of a balanced combination of carrots and sticks is an extremely difficult
task. It generally requires that one not only pays attention to economic aspects but also to the
institutional and socio-political context within which projects are to be implemented.
Obviously, it requires an in-depth knowledge of the local situation in all cases.
Table 1: Attributes associated with successful technology support projects for SE
Attributes relating to project objectives / focus Attributes relating to mode of implementation
Customer-focus:
Projects designed around client needs rather than
driven by supply capacity of assistance
institutions
Collectiveness:
Beneficiaries are clustered groups of SE rather
than individual enterprises
Capability-focus:
Technological learning rather than one-off
improvements in hardware seen to be required for
sustaining SE competitiveness
Concentration:
Focused assistance delivery through more
selective targeting of beneficiaries and indirect
targeting via ‘nodal actors’ in the supply chain.
Context:
Emphasis on creating an information-rich
environment for SE
Coordination:
Streamlining of assistance delivery by avoiding
duplication and striving for complementarity
between different projects and programmes
Complementarity:
Project aims and focus must fit in with macro-
economic structure and level of economic
development
‘Carrot-and-stick’ approach:
Design of effective incentive structure aimed at
project sustainability, making use of, rather than
replacing, market forces
An appropriate set of incentives and sanctions that make use of market forces rather
than replace the market is crucial for achieving sustainability (or ‘cumulativeness’) of projects.
This applies both to the delivery of the project services and the dissemination of the benefits
thereof (Dawson and Jeans, 1997). This aspect is assuming increasing importance in project
design. Projects must evolve certain institutional forms of (usually collective) self-help that
will, over time, start to function independently from external aid agencies.
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One or more of the general principles outlined above have been applied in several
recent projects in different developing countries. We provide one example from one of the
industrially most advanced developing economies in East Asia, one from a middle-income
country in Latin America, and one from a low-income country in Africa.
(a) Upgrading of local subcontractors in Singapore
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The Singaporean experience with technical assistance to SE is perhaps not an obvious
example. The country is better known for its success in attracting high-tech multinationals than
boosting local small-scale industries. This image is somewhat misleading. Over the years this
country has evolved a remarkably well-organised and elaborate support system for SEs, in
which technical upgrading takes up a central place. A local ancillary sector is considered to be
crucial for Singapore’s continued international competitiveness in high-tech electronics. For
example, the presence of large TNCs in the disk drive industry depends on the availability of
high quality suppliers in precision engineering.
Many of the ‘C’ features discussed above are in evidence in the Singapore support
system, especially demand-led, private sector-supported approaches to assistance delivery,
performance pressures, attention to macro-economic fundamentals, carefully thought-out
institutionalisation, tight coordination of the different assistance activities, and the importance
of a capability-focused approach.
The country has been providing technological assistance to local SEs ever since 1962,
but the programmes acquired real momentum in 1989 when the various measures and
initiatives were consolidated under the SME master plan presented by the Economic
Development Board (EDB) in 1989. Fabricated metal and machinery industries receive most
attention because these form the core group of supplier industries.
The Local Industry Upgrading Programme (LIUP) forms the most significant
component of technical assistance. It has been designed to forge close links between TNCs
and subcontractors / suppliers. The EDB is essentially playing the role of ‘network broker’, an
idea that has also worked well in a few other countries.
15 The TNCs are asked to take several
SEs under their wing, and are expected to provide training in areas such as management,
quality control, process engineering and industrial engineering through visits, workshops,
consulting activities and so on. The aim is ambitious: technical standards are to be raised to a
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TNC community locally. In return, TNCs receive considerable subsidies, up to 90 per cent of
the costs involved, which are partly borne by the participating SEs themselves. The TNCs also
provide an experienced engineer on secondment to the EDB for two or three years (paid for
by the EDB), who then works closely with the SEs and identifies focused areas for TNC
assistance. The participating SEs meanwhile also have access to a variety of financial support
schemes operated by the same organisation. The EDB is the central coordinator of SE support
in the country, and it has established a ‘one window’ approach to assistance delivery.
An assessment of this scheme noted several significant technological learning
mechanisms, namely:
• learning through direct know-how transfers,
• learning through feedback provided by stringent quality / performance control by the
TNCs,
• learning through exposure to information resources provided by the TNCs, and
• learning through, and as a result of, investments in capital equipment and other forms of
new technology by the SEs that they would not have made in the absence of their
relationship with the supporting TNC.
(b) Technical upgrading through public procurement in Brazil
One project that embodies several of the features discussed above is a public
procurement scheme for school furniture in the Brazilian State of Ceará.
16 The scheme was
organised by the Industry and Commerce Department (SIC) of the state government, together
with SEBRAE, the Brazilian SMIDO, after the central government decided to seek out
alternative, small-scale suppliers of wood products in regions that had been badly hit by a
drought, as a sort of alternative to a public works programme.
Thus, the scheme was first of all demand-driven, in the sense that it started with the
creation of a new market opportunity that could be used by SEs to ‘pull themselves up
technologically’. It was also narrowly focused on one particular economic activity carried out
by a small group of SEs in one particular locality. However, that technological upgrading did
indeed occur also had a lot to do with the clever way in which the scheme was
institutionalised. The main institutional elements contributing to its success appear to have
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• Two important features set up tremendous pressures on the assistance deliverers and the
beneficiaries to perform: Firstly, while a new potential market opportunity was created, the
customer, in this case the Education Department, was not obliged to proceed with the
procurement from the SE if the quality of the products remained below that of the regular
(large-scale) suppliers. Hence, rather than creating a protected market, the scheme created
competition between large and small. Secondly, the scheme received a lot of attention in
the media nation-wide. Achievement of success could thus bring potentially high rewards
(in political terms) for the agencies involved, whereas failure would entail public loss of
face.
• In view of the large orders, which exceeded the production capacity of any one of the
individual producers, the SEs were contracted as a group. An association was formed for
the purpose, with encouragement from SEBRAE. The association was responsible for
quality and honouring product warranties, and had to coordinate the activities of the
individual members. The one element of subsidy was advance payment of half the order
amount, which provided much needed working capital. In case of default of one of the
association members, the association was again responsible for repayment. By making the
association the focal point in the transactions, it was in the interest of members to monitor
each others’ performance  (rather like the case of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh).
Meanwhile the existence of the association lowered the transaction costs involved in
dealing with SIC and SEBRAE. Moreover, group formation enabled the producers to
engage in collective learning because they had to communicate and collaborate.
• The customer / demand-driven approach as a starting point of the project also led to a well
focused and efficient form of technical consulting and R&D assistance. Participating SEs
would meet to discuss their technical bottlenecks, and only then call on SEBRAE
engineers to provide assistance with the specific problems they needed to solve in order to
deliver the required quality at the agreed price at the right time.
The success of this project is evident from substantial investments in power tools, and
capacity and capability upgrading among the participating enterprises, as a result of which they
were able to enter new markets and diversify their customer base considerably. At the time
that Tendler and Amorim wrote their assessment, a full 70 per cent of output was already
going to the private sector. The association has become an important institution locally,
initiating many developmental activities without help from the original assistance agencies.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS21 25
(c) Technology capability building in small metal workshops in Kenya
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The Farm Implements and Tools (FIT) programme implemented in Kenya and Ghana
by the ILO and a Dutch NGO called TOOL is an example of a tightly focused, dynamic user-
driven approach to group-based technical assistance which is designed to operate under quite
hostile economic conditions and in economies at a low stage of economic, technological and
infrastructural development. The focus here is on the Kenyan component since this is the best-
documented part of the programme. Its aim is to strengthen local capacity to undertake
activities that can spark technological upgrading of farm equipment and food processing
equipment, which can contribute to higher productivity and incomes in user-enterprises (i.e.
farms and home industries). This entails a process of technological learning among the
participating SEs.
The assistance programme essentially functions as a facilitator to get these activities off
the ground and to embed them institutionally in such a way that they become self-sustaining
over time. The participating SEs and other private sector participants must show a willingness
to pay part or all of the costs right from the beginning. Several services have been developed
according to this philosophy, which are beginning to show some success. One such activity is
the organisation of group visits by small-scale entrepreneurs to bigger enterprises elsewhere in
the country or abroad. Another is the facilitation of direct communication with the users of
farm implements (i.e. farmers). ‘Brokering workshops’, initially designed to evaluate the
impact of these two activities, became an independent activity in itself because the informal
information exchange that took place in these fora obviously filled a need among the
participants. Finally, help to SEs in identifying new markets through teaching them a simple
form of market research dubbed ‘rapid market appraisal’ has also been offered.
The effects of these activities appear to be favourable, as indicated by the results and
by the willingness of the participating SEs to continue participating over a period of time, and
pay at least part of the cost. As far as the results are concerned, the group visits to other
enterprises were an important source of ideas about new and improved farm equipment that
the SEs could also try to produce. Many entrepreneurs also benefited from seeing
metalworking machinery, tools and measuring instruments in operation, and decided to acquire
new tools such as scales, a micrometer and so on. Improved linkages with suppliers of spare
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especially in the area of customer relations, record keeping and employee relations. The trade
fairs were also quite successful as a vehicle for effective user-producer interaction. Thanks to
the involvement of the smallholder farmers, who took great interest in this opportunity to
express their wishes for improved designs and quality, and who even financed their own travel
from far-flung places to be able to come to the meeting point, several SEs started to
experiment with products. Some did so after they noticed the results of the technological
efforts undertaken by their competitors, afraid that they would lose custom if they did not
keep up with the new developments – an example of a ‘stick-type’ incentive in operation.
The FIT programme is strongly demand-driven. The project organisers understood
very well that: ‘The demand by SEs for (their) services is ultimately financed by sales to their
customers, and it is the demand and perceptions of these customers which are therefore the
origin of all sustainable activities with SEs.’ For that reason, the activities have to translate
into substantial improvements in SE products and services, so that customers will stand to
benefit when they decide to use them.
One could argue that such improvements may take some time to materialise and that
some degree of market failure is therefore inevitable, justifying a permanent public subsidy.
However, in resource-poor countries like Kenya, the likelihood of such activities attracting
public money on a sustained basis is quite remote. In such conditions, projects like FIT, which
do not expect such subsidies and adhere to stringent financial viability conditions, obviously
stand the best chance of success.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
From ‘supply-push’ to ‘eightfold-C’: the practice of technology support for SEs has evidently
come a long way since the early 1970s. Firstly, and most important, the notion of what should
constitute ‘success’ in projects and programmes is evolving in a more realistic direction over
time. It is no longer based on the idea that SEs should essentially play the role of passive
recipients and beneficiaries of improved technologies that have been developed elsewhere in
the economy or brought in from abroad. We are moving towards the understanding that
durable competitiveness of SE must entail an internal capability on their part to make
improvements in products, processes and organisation on an ongoing basis. Only then can we
expect such enterprises to make a contribution to countries’ industrialisation which goes
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are those where firms of all sizes, including the smallest ones, are actively involved in, and
contribute to, the national knowledge accumulation process (Bruton, 1985, p.81).
Secondly, there is a growing understanding among LDC government agencies and
donor organisations about the broad features associated with project success so defined. These
principles appear to be common to projects and programmes across major geographical
regions that are technologically and economically quite diverse. Even policy makers and
assistance agencies operating in countries that are at higher stages of economic and
technological advancement may draw some inspiration from the list of features outlined in this
paper. In particular, we now know that the development of producers’ capability will generally
entail a process of technological learning on the part of the people involved. The literature
reviewed for this paper also suggests that such learning is likely to be most effective when
producers have an opportunity to interact with each other and with other actors in the
economy, especially their customers.
Effective projects are those that stimulate these processes by establishing or facilitating
such interactions, by making sure that there is an appropriate incentive structure that will spur
producers’ efforts (especially one that makes rewards conditional upon performance), and by
providing specific professional assistance where needed. This requires an in-depth knowledge
of the macro-economic, institutional and socio-political context and concentration of the
assistance effort on one or two specific industries.
Of course, the above does not constitute a ready blueprint for technical assistance.
Even if there were many more detailed analytical case studies about successful projects than
we can draw upon at present – and we certainly do need more of them –, an ideal model is
unlikely ever to emerge. Blind copying (although it unfortunately also starts with the letter
‘C’) is never a good recipe for good results. The design and implementation of every new
project must always entail an act of creativity (yet another ‘C’!) to adapt and operationalise
general principles in such a way as to fit well within the local context within which it is to be
implemented.QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS21 28
ENDNOTES
1 Levitsky (1994) and Aylward (1998) are reviews of venture capital programmes in different developed and
developing countries. Park (1993) has details about the Korean case. The Indian experience is described in
Karunakaran (1994).
2 For an elaboration of the distinction between poverty alleviation and business growth as objectives of small
enterprise support projects, see Dawson and Jeans (1997).
3 See especially Watanabe’s insightful studies about subcontracting linkages (e.g., Watanabe, 1983).
4 This argument is based on the ‘rigid factor proportions’ problem, first propounded by Eckaus (1955).
5 See Bongenaar and Szirmai (1998) for a detailed account of the problems associated with the top-down
approach in a Tanzanian technology institute.
6 Good examples are documented in Basant (1990), Ishikawa (1975), and Francks (1979).
7 See Basant (1990), Smillie (1991) and Powell (1995).
8 See, e.g., UNDP et al. (1988).
9 See Lall (1996).
10 See World Bank (1993), pp. 149-152, for a discussion about the de-industrialisation debate.
11 See Lall (1992) and UNCTAD (1996) for good reviews of the capability literature.
12 The Argentina case is documented in Cortes (1979), the Colombia case in Cortes et al. (1987), the Brazil
case in Gupta (1994), the Thai case in Mingsarn (1986), the Pakistan case in Aftab and Rahim (1986 and
1989) and Romijn (1998) and the Zimbabwe case in Watanabe (1987). Several additional cases are reviewed in
Romijn (1998).
13 See, e.g., Levy et al. (forthcoming).
14 The Singapore subsection is based on Wong (1994).
15 For example, in the case of  Malaysia’s car manufacturer Proton, SEs gained access to manufacturing know-
how about complex car components in a similar way. A useful review of successful and less successful policy
experiences with subcontracting promotion in different developing countries is contained in Altenburg (1997).
16 The case is described in detail by Tendler and Amorim (1996) and summarised in Humphrey and Schmitz
(1996). This subsection is based on these two works.
17 The Kenya subsection is based on Tanburn (1996).QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS21 29
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